Participation of beneficiaries in the monitoring of public services is increasingly seen as a key to improving their efficiency. In India, the current government flagship program on universal primary education organizes both locally elected leaders and parents of children enrolled in public schools into committees and gives these groups powers over resource allocation, and monitoring and management of school performance. However, in a baseline survey we found that people were not aware of the existence of these committees and their potential for improving education. This paper evaluates three different interventions to encourage beneficiaries' participation through these committees: providing infonnation, training community members in a new testing tool, and training and organizing volunteers to hold remedial reading camps for illiterate children. We find that these interventions had no impact on community involvement in public schools, and no impact on teacher effort or learning outcomes in those schools.
. However, in both these cases the incentives were implemented by the non-governmental organization (NGO) that ran the program. When government bureaucrats have to implement them, the incentives were ineffectual. In Kenya, for example, head teachers were given grants to reward teachers who attend regularly. Even though the head teacher could use the money to get other things for the school if they did not use it to reward the teachers, they almost universally chose to give the money to the teachers, irrespective of whether the teacher had done anything to deserve it, with the result that the incentive had no impact (Kremer and Chen, 2002) . In India a reform that was meant to link government nurses' pay to their attendance was initially very effective, but failed to have any impact after the local bureaucracy started providing official excuses for most of the nurses' absences (Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008) .
The poor incentives of bureaucrats and public providers to deliver quality services contrasts with evidence of strong incentives of governments to deliver quantity, especially in education, by building schools and recruiting teachers (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006 , Keefer and Khemani, 2004 , and Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007 . Keefer and Khemani (2005) , building on a large political economy literature-*, argue that this can be explained by political incentives of governments that are skewed toward the provision of private and verifiable benefits to some citizens, at the expense of quality improvements that are more diffuse and harder to verify. Providing (secure) jobs through teacher recruitment, or scholarships and other transfers, is more effective in winning elections than getting teachers to teach. ' For health, Das and Hammer (2005) show that the average time spent by a public doctor to examine a patients is 2 minutes, and that the average \isit does not include any physical exam. In education, Chaudhur}', et al. (2006) find that half of the teachers present in school in India were not teaching at the time of the investigator's visit. -For example, Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2002) find no impact from textbooks, Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin and Zitzewitz (2004) find no impact from flip charts, and Banerjee, Kremer and Jacob, (2004) find no impact from additional teachers in India. For discussion and more references, see Glewwe and Kremer (2006) . 3 See, on the other hand, Glewwe, Uias, and Kremer (2003) for a cautionar)' tale on multitasking by teachers even when incentives are properly implemented.
See, e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson. .(2001) ; Banerjee and I>er (2005) , Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) ; Rajan (2007) (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999; Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; Paul, 1987 (Kremer and Vermeersch, 2002; Olken, 2005 ; Banerjee and Bjorkman-Svensson, 2006; and Duflo, Dupas, Kremer, 2007) .
The contrast between the impact of the first and particularly the second intervention on volunteering and the impact of the third is perhaps less surprising, but it reinforces the evidence presented in Banerjee and showing Figure 9 ). they consider the most pressing issues in the village, education ranl<:s fifth on the list of village problems, with just 13. i percent of respondents mentioning it at all. Giving people more information, on the other hand, need not always promote greater collective action. For example, if the only people who were acting initially were those who believed that the returns to collective action were very large, information that gave everyone a more realistic sense of the effectiveness of collective action might very well reduce the total effort put in. However, in our particular context this effect seems unlikely because for most people the effect of the information should have been to make them, ceteris paribus, more wilhng to act: First because they were being told that they had more powers than they had previously imagined, and second because they discovered that the problem was more serious than most of them had known and therefore there was a greater need to act.
However, this presumes that they registered the information that they were being given. ' In retrospect, this contrast between the lack of effect of intervention 2 and the success of intervention 3, is clearly a result of the fact that a small group action was facilitated in intervention 3, while intervention 2 emphasized large group action and did not directly facilitate anything that could be done in a small group, (though there was nothing to prevent \illagers from independently taking up a small group action). The contrast between a small group action and a large group action is presumably in part a result of the challenges of sustaining collective action in a large group. If parents and the VEC expected that the action would eventually collapse, one can see why they would choose to close their mind to the whole thing from the beginning and not even register the information that was being given in the meetings. The small group action, by contrast, required little coordination, especially since the classes could be held pretty much anywhere in the village by anyone who was interested and motivated. In part it may also reflect general skepticism among parents and other community members that the school system can deliver much more unless there is a major systemic reform (this may well be a misjudgment-there is a tendency to judge schools by their appearance-but it is certainly an opinion that one encounters quite often). If so, they may not feel that it's worth their while to fight to make it work better. They may be more optimistic about initiatives taken by individual citizens, such as the reading classes.
The power of individual actions that can generate collective benefits can also explain the impacts of the participatory interventions studied by Olken (2005) . He carried out a randomized evaluation of a program in Indonesia.
In some villages, non-ehte villagers were invited to a meeting where the financial details of road construction in the village were discussed-the idea was that they had the option of speaking up if they did not agree with what was being claimed. In another, randomly chosen, set of villages, anonymous complaint forms were distributed to villagers to expose any corruption in road construction that they knew about. While the first program had no effect on overall corruption, it substantially reduced the amount of leakage that happened through inflated claims about the number of labor hours, which is the only part of the spending that directly impacted the lives of the average villager (since they supply the labor).
The second program reduced overall corruption, but only in villages where the comment form was distributed via school students to take to their parents, completely bypassing the village government. Both gave individuals the scope to act on their own, essentially by complaining, though neither offered any direct control. The second program also protected the identity of the complainant, which might explain its greater success.
There is also other evidence that it is hard to make large group indirect control work. In Kenya, for example, encouraging school committees to report on teacher performance to the district administration (Kremer and Vermeersch, 2002) did little to improve absence rates. Banerjee and describe an intervention where the village community was alerted to the fact that the health worker in the government-run village sub-center was absent. This had absolutely no effect even though, in principle, the community had the right to complain through the village institutions.
The one potentially important exception to this rule is an intervention in the health sector in Uganda that seems in many ways to be very similar to ours (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2006 (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2006) or more than 13,000 people assuming a household size of six. That means that the 50 dispensaries in the study cover nearly 3.3 percent of Uganda's population. Being on the HUMC is therefore potentially more prestigious than being on the VEC and might therefore attract a more elite group of villagers, which would make it easier for the HUMC to act on its own. The fact that the interventions led to the replacement of the HUMC members may be an indicator that HUMC membership was perceived, at least post-intervention, as being something to aspire to, whereas no one seemed to value VEC membership. Second, the Community-Based Organizations (CEOs) that facilitated the intervention in Uganda seem to have played a much more active role in pressuring public providers to improve performance than Pratham chose to play. For example, facilitators from these organizations in Uganda directly negotiated vvath the dispensary staff before involving the villagers, and the villagers who got involved were hand picked by the CBO. Pratham felt that any intervention that would require them to be any more involved could not have been scaleable; given that health centers are much larger than the schools, and that CBOs were themselves largely local organizations, sustainability may have been less of a concern in the Uganda case. In '8 Arguably the HUMCs had less direct influence than the SSA model, in which the VEC has some direct power over the Shiksha Mitras.
any event, the involvement of the CBO meant that the local (or non-local) elites were much more involved in the collective action in Uganda than they were in UP. This may be important because most villagers in Jaunpur had no experience of complaining about education to anybody (who do you complain to?) let alone getting a response: Indeed some of them commented to the Pratham team that even the idea of having a village wide-discussion about education was novel. In the circumstances it is not implausible that some more "leadership" would have helped, though its worth remembering that the head of the rillage was invited to the meeting and was present in a substantial fraction of them (on the other hand, at least in India, the village head does not command a lot of influence beyond the village).
Another related possibility, along the lines argued by Banerjee and , is that the Ugandan intervention's "action plan," drawn by the public providers and the community, was more specific in its Of course these are only some of the many potential differences between the two models. Another possibility is that health is different, either because people care more about it (although people cared enough about education to volunteer the time to teach classes) or because, the non-delivery of health services is much more easily and reliably observed by an individual ("I was entitled to that service but I did not get it"), than the non-delivery of effective teaching (what constitutes effective teaching?). Indeed, this might introduce an element of individual action, since people could start going to the clinics and demand the services they did not know they were entitled to before. This kind of individual action is less straightforward in the case of education since monitoring non-delivery requires regular visits to the school Oack of teacher effort is the main problem). Finally, the differential response by public providers in UP and Uganda may reflect the fact that Indian teachers are less sensitive to social opprobrium than Ugandan nurses. It appears that Ugandan nurses are often from the community itself, whereas teachers in Uttar Pradesh generally come from outside the village, belong to upper social strata compared to parents, and are powerfully unionized. In the field-work during this study, Pratham facilitators often noted that teachers tended to blame parents for their lack of interest in education as the most relevant source of poor learning outcomes. It is therefore possible that citizens are unable to exert pressure on these teachers, while social pressure seemed to have played a role in Uganda. '9 The results of this intervention also contrast with those of an educational intervention in Kenya Kenya where parent-teacher committees in primary schools were given the right (and the resources) to hire extra teachers on short-term contracts and to decide whether the teachers ought to be renewed (Duflo, Dupas, Kremer, 2007) 
And in the (randomly chosen) half of the schools where the committee was provided a day-long training that affirmed and '5 This is unlikely to be the whole stor>' since the Shiksha Mitras in India do come from the community' (through often the upper strata of the community) and they did not respond any more to the intervention than the regular teachers.
explained their exact rights in this regard, the program was more effective in improving children's learning experience, mainly because regular teachers were less likely to bully the extra teachers into teaching their class for them. 
